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In 1992, the Government of 
India passed the 73rd and 74th 
amendments to adopt a 
decentralised model of 
governance. The Panchayat 
Briefs series examines the 
impact of these reforms in the 
context of new research on 
decentralisation in India. 
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The third brief in this series 
analyses the structure and 
impact of decentralisation in 
three countries – Bolivia, 
Switzerland and Uganda. 
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International Experiences with Decentralisation 
Summary 
 Decentralisation is a global trend with 80% of 
developing countries experimenting with some 
form of decentralisation.  
 
 Bolivia: Decentralisation reforms in 1994 and 
1995 expanded the scale of municipal 
government. 20% of the national budget was 
transferred directly to municipalities.  Public 
investment in municipalities increased from 0.7 
to 12%. Decentralization resulted in a shift in 
the distribution of public sector expenditure. 
Municipalities channelled new resources to the 
neediest areas, with poor municipalities 
investing up to 79% in high priority sectors such 
as health and education.  
 
 Switzerland: The Swiss Federation has a three 
tiered system of government where 
responsibilities are shared between communes 
(local), cantons, (intermediate) and the 
confederation (national). Communes and 
cantons have strong fiscal powers with 77% of 
canton revenues and 84% of commune revenues 
generated from own revenues. Cantons have 
independent control over their budgets, financial 
resources and also have taxation powers.  
 
 Uganda: Decentralisation reforms were 
introduced in the 1990s making local 
governments responsible for delivering local 
goods such as education, health, and water 
services. Though the reforms were extensive, the 
lack of adequate fiscal decentralisation, 
education, awareness and training amongst 
government functionaries has hampered the 
effectiveness of local governments.  
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Decentralisation is widely recognised as a policy reform that when “... carefully planned, 
effectively implemented and appropriately managed can lead to significant 
improvement(s) in the welfare of people at the local level...” (UNDP, 2004: 2). It is 
estimated that 80% of developing countries are experimenting with some form of 
decentralisation (UNDP, 2002). The degree and type of decentralisation varies by region 
and experiments with decentralisation have produced interesting results in different 
countries. This policy brief analyses the structure and impact of decentralisation in 
three countries - Bolivia, Switzerland and Uganda.  
 
Designing Decentralisation 
Decentralisation has many definitions but broadly it describes “the transfer of 
responsibility for planning, management, resource raising and allocation from the 
central government and its agencies to the lower levels of government” (UNDP, 2002: 
5). Decentralisation can be administrative (where public functions and staff are 
assigned to lower levels of government); fiscal (where funds and revenue raising 
powers are devolved to lower levels of government), political (where decision making 
powers are devolved to lower levels of government) (Jütting et al (2005). Countries 
have experimented with administrative, fiscal and political decentralisation to varying 
degrees often in combination with one another (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1. Decentralisation by Region 
 
Source: UNDP (2002: 11) 
 
In practice, effective decentralisation requires the clear assignment of duties and 
responsibilities (functions); sufficient resources (funds) and staff (functionaries) 
needed to carry out public duties at each level of government. The 3Fs as they are 
commonly known are critical to the design of any decentralised system and must be 
carefully sequenced to ensure their success.  In the following section, we look at how 
three countries – Bolivia, Switzerland and Uganda – have devolved the 3Fs to local 
governments.  
 
Decentralisation: An International Perspective 
 
Bolivia: In Bolivia, the Law of Popular Participation 1994 (LPP) and the Law of 
Administrative Decentralisation 1995 (LAD-adm), define the legal framework of 
decentralisation. While the LPP sets out the framework for decentralisation at the 
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municipal level, the LAD-adm outlines decentralisation at the departmental level. Both 
laws go hand in hand and are linked to a National System of Planning which outlines 
three levels of planning and development at the national, departmental and municipal 
level (Seemann, 2004).  
 
Functions:  Decentralisation dramatically extended the scale of municipal government in 
Bolivia. The LPP created 311 municipalities (there are now 320) each with their own 
democratically elected mayors and town councils. Each municipality was granted 
territorial power and made responsible for a range of development activities including 
infrastructure, local roads, sports, health and education etc. Basic Territorial 
Committees (OTBs) were created to represent local communities and to channelize 
debate on local developmental issues (Ibid).  Municipal vigilance committees (Comités 
de Vigilancia) with veto powers over municipal budgets and reports were also set up to 
oversee and monitor municipal expenditure (Kohl, 2003). At the departmental level, 
under the LAD-adm, a prefecture administrative was created to oversee the 
decentralisation of public services in all departments. At the national level, the national 
executive was reorganised to better support municipal governments. This was 
accomplished through a reorganisation of regional development units to support 
municipalities and integrate their functions (Seemann, 2004). 
 
Funds:  The reforms brought about a massive shift in resources towards municipalities. 
Previously, 308 municipalities were forced to share a mere 14% of devolved funds, 
while 3 cities enjoyed a share of 86%. With decentralisation, these figures were 
reversed with municipalities enjoying 73% of the share and cities only 27% (Faguet, 
2004). In total, the reforms transferred 20% of the national budget to the newly created 
municipalities. There was also a 17 time increase in the share of public investments 
received by municipalities (from 0.7 to 12%). Notably, municipalities have individual 
bank accounts into which funds assigned to municipalities are transferred daily by the 
central government on a per capita block grant basis (i.e. in proportion to the 
population) (Seemann, 2004). In Bolivia, the decentralisation of power to municipal 
governments has led to fundamental changes in the pattern of public sector spending. 
Municipal governments made greater investments in social sectors such as education, 
water and sanitation, agriculture and urban development to the tune of 79% of total 
municipal investment (Faguet, 2004).  Thus decentralisation in Bolivia, has “led to 
higher investment in human capital and social services as the poorest regions of the 
country chose projects according to their greatest needs” (Ibid: 887).   
 
Functionaries: Municipalities hire their own staff and have developed their own local 
bureaucracies. It has been estimated that between 1994 and 1996, the LPP created 
30,000 new jobs. However, despite the increase in staffing, limited administrative 
capacity remains a major handicap to effective local government in Bolivia (Kohl, 2003). 
Municipalities are often unable to perform the tasks assigned to them because of 
administrative problems such as lack of trained and competent staff (Seemann, 2004). 
 
Switzerland: The Swiss Federation is a complex three layered system of government 
divided into communes at the local level, cantons at the intermediate level and the 
confederation at the national level (Dafflon, 1999).  The strength of local government in 
Switzerland has been attributed to the strong tradition of local participation; the 
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connection between elected politicians and their communities and the fact that citizens 
identify strongly with their communes (Kälin, 2000).  
 
Functions: In most areas, responsibilities are shared between the three levels of 
government. While the confederation is primarily responsible for foreign affairs and 
national defence – cantons and communes are responsible for education, culture, sports, 
health, roads etc (Dafflon, 1999). Cantons enjoy a great deal of autonomy and have the 
right to enact their own constitution. Each of the 26 cantons has its own parliament, 
government and judiciary. Within the cantons, all citizens have the right to vote in 
elections.  Switzerland’s 3000 communes also enjoy a great deal of political autonomy 
and can select their own political and administrative structure subject to cantonal 
legislation (Kälin, 2000). Communes are responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of roads, managing local transportation, providing water, running primary 
and secondary schools etc. They have the right to plan and implement these activities 
within the remit of cantonal legislation. 
 
Funds: In Switzerland, each level of government has direct access to at least 2 major 
sources of revenue. Income tax is the most important source of revenue followed by 
VAT (Value added tax). Cantons enjoy independent control over their budgets, financial 
resources and have taxation powers (Dafflon, 1999). In addition, they enjoy a strong 
financial position as they receive 40% of the tax share.  Communes receive 
approximately 30% of the tax share and have the right to impose taxes. The tax share of 
the federal government is equal with that of the communes at 30% (Kälin, 2000). There 
is a low dependence of communes and cantons on revenue transfers as 77% of canton 
revenues and 84% of commune revenues are generated from own revenues. Cantons 
and communes spend a large percentage of their revenues on improving public services 
(Dafflon, 1999).  
 
Functionaries: In order to execute the activities assigned to them cantons and 
communes hire and appoint their own staff. There is a clear demarcation of tasks 
between central and cantonal as well as cantonal and communal levels of government 
such that there is little overlapping of powers or activities (Kälin, 2000). 
 
Uganda: Decentralisation in Uganda has been described as one of the most far reaching 
local government reform programs in the developing world. The Ugandan government 
embarked on a full fledged decentralisation reform program in the 1990s. The Local 
Governments Act 1997 comprehensively lays out the roles and responsibilities of 
different levels of government. 
 
Functions: In Uganda, local government is organised into a five tiered pyramidal 
structure which in rural areas consists of  i) village, ii) parish, iii) sub-county, iv) county 
and v) district. In urban areas, local government is divided in  i) village, ii) ward or 
parish, iii) municipal division, town or city, iv) municipality and v) city and urban areas. 
The key institution at all local levels is the council composed of elected members who 
represent specific electoral areas or interest groups. Local governments are responsible  
for managing facilities and delivering local goods such as education, health and water 
services etc while the central government handles defence, security, foreign relations 
and responsible for developing national policy guidelines (Steiner, 2006). 
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Funds: Local governments have been empowered to levy and collect a range of local 
taxes. For instance, district and urban local governments can impose property tax and 
other non-tax revenues such as market dues, parking fees and trading licenses. To 
supplement their incomes, local governments also receive inter-governmental grants 
and transfers. It has been estimated that approximately 30% of the national budget is 
transferred to local governments as inter-governmental transfers and 27% of total 
public expenditure is spent at the local level. Despite these high figures, in practice, 
resources to local governments are insufficient and fiscal transfers from the central 
government are low and tied to conditions. In addition, local collection of taxes and 
revenues is extremely low. According to Steiner (2006) fiscal decentralisation in Uganda 
was implemented without taking into consideration the cost of decentralising services – 
this has had an adverse impact on the ability of local governments to perform their 
roles. 
 
Functionaries: Staffing of local governments has been a major problem in Uganda as 
there is a lack of educated and experienced civil servants such as planners, engineers 
and teachers particularly in remote areas.  Moreover, there is a tendency for local 
governments to appoint personnel on the basis of ethnicity or residence rather than 
merit (Ibid, 2006). The participation of local communities in local government 
processes continues to be a challenge with the continued dominance of local elites 
(UNDP, 2002: 13).   
 
Conclusion 
The experiences of Bolivia, Switzerland and Uganda suggest that the sequencing of 
decentralisation reforms is important.  In the absence of effective sequencing, 
decentralisation reforms can fail. In Uganda, the lack of sufficient funds and staff has 
hampered the effectiveness of local governments in carrying out tasks assigned to them. 
In marked contrast, decentralisation in Switzerland has been more effective as cantons 
have sufficient administrative and fiscal autonomy to guide local development 
processes effectively.  To conclude, when designing decentralisation reforms, countries 
need to carefully consider the role of government; decide how finances will match 
responsibilities at every level and figure out the all important balance between 
autonomy and control (Lister and Betley, 1999). According to Sharma (2005, 2008) 
policymakers and governments should keep in mind the following key principles when 
developing blueprints for decentralisation:   
 Finance should follow function; 
 There should be informed public opinion; 
 Mechanisms to make local priorities known should be established; 
 There should be incentives for people to participate; 
 Local priorities must be adhered too; 
 Local governments must be incentivised to be fiscally responsible; 
 Decentralisation instruments should be designed to support political objectives. 
__________________________________________ 
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